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1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, world politics have undergone a dramatic trans-
formation, shedding an obsession with superpower rivalry in favor 
of an emphasis on unprecedented international cooperation along 
with transitions to democratic rule in all parts of the globe. l Al-
though these new developments do not necessarily signal the end 
of either authoritarianism, violent conflicts, or anti-democratic ide-
ologies, they are strong manifestations of a new world order in 
* J.D. (University of Texas); Ph.D. (Yale University). Member of the Texas Bar. The 
author, a Lecturer and the Assistant Coordinator of the Career Development Fellowship 
Program for Black Southern Africans at Yale, is also a regular consultant to the Ford 
Foundation on South African and Namibian issues. 
I See generally FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: COPING WITH THE LEGACIES OF Au-
THORITARIANISM AND TOTALITARIANISM (John H. Herz ed., 1982); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, 
THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); GUILLERMO 
O'DONNELL ET AL., TRANSITION FROM AUTHORITARIAN RULE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
(1986). 
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which democracy is fast becoming the paramount moral principle 
in the quest for political power. Not surprisingly, during the last 
decade the number of studies of democratic transition has ex-
ploded.2 Although these works endeavor to explore the numerous 
pathways to democratic transition and the resulting influences on 
all aspects of political and social life, studies have given only limited 
attention to post-transition reconciliation strategies that impact on 
the character of new democracies and their long-term stability. 
One of the most vexing questions facing new democracies is 
how to treat the sordid inheritance of human rights violations per-
petrated by predecessor regimes. In some instances, governments 
have endeavored to bring the worst offenders to justice on t~e 
ground that penalties are necessary to discourage the future com-
mission of heinous acts. 3 In other situations, governments have 
rejected calls for prosecutions out of fear that legal action may 
retard rather than advance the goal of nation-building.4 As South 
Africa struggles toward what many hope will be a non-racial, non-
sexist, democratic political order, the issue of whether or not to 
prosecute human rights violators-participants in abuses during 
decades of National Party (NP)5 rule-demands resolution and 
forms part of a larger debate over the many thorny issues surround-
ing legitimacy and how to confer it on the nascent democracy.6 
This Article maintains that prosecution of human rights viola-
tors is an essential but not problem-free means of conferring legit-
imacy-both domestic and international-on any new democratic 
regime that comes to power in South Africa. Part II examines the 
issue of amnesty in the context of the negotiations currently taking 
place in the country. Part III deals with the concept of legitimacy 
2 On transitional governments, see, for example, Lynn Berat & Yossi Shain, Evening the 
Score: Layered Legacies of the Interregnum, J. THIRD WORLD STUD. (Spring 1993) (forthcoming) 
[hereinafter Evening the Score]; Lynn Berat & Yossi Shain, Provisional Governments in Democ-
ratization: The" International Interim Government" Model and the Case of Namibia, 29 COEXISTENCE: 
A REVIEW OF EAST-WEST AND DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 19 (1992). See also STEPHEN P. RILEY, THE 
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN AFRICA: AN END TO THE ONE-PARTY STATE? (1991); TRANSITION 
TO DEMOCRACY: POLICY PERSPECTIVES 1991 (Robin Lee & Lawrence Schlemmer eds., 1991). 
3 Alice H. Henkin, Conference Report, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 3 (1989). 
4Id. 
5 The National Party came to power in 1948 after campaigning for election with an 
emphasis on a policy of "Apartheid" ("Apartness"). LEONARD M. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 157-62, 177-86 (1990). 
6 For a discussion of the difficulties in creating respect for the rule of law and making 
the judicial system appear legitimate in the eyes of blacks, see Lynn Berat, The South African 
Judiciary and the Protection of Human Rights: A Strategy for a New South Africa, 5 TEMP. INT'L & 
COMPo L.J. 181 (1991). 
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and considers arguments about the treatment of human rights vi-
olators from predecessor regimes in the international context. Part 
IV discusses international human rights standards to which new 
governments can appeal in their efforts to prosecute offenders. Part 
V assesses the efficacy of current South African amnesty legislation 
and briefly sketches prosecution guidelines for a democratic South 
African government. The Article concludes that a new South Af-
rican government can enhance its legitimacy only by prosecuting 
human rights violations under international human rights stan-
dards. 
II. THE ISSUE OF AMNESTY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW 
DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT 
A. The South African Debacle 
The 1990s began in South Africa with considerable drama. In 
early February 1990, State President Frederik W. De Klerk made a 
speech that many took as an indication that he was serious about 
transforming South Africa.7 The announced measures included the 
sanction of the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-African-
ist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party (SACP), 
and other groups;8 the lifting of restrictions on thirty-three other 
organizations, including the powerful Congress of South African 
Trade Unions; the release of most political prisoners; the lifting of 
restrictions on 374 freed detainees; the limiting of detention-with-
out-trial to six months, with provisions for legal representation and 
medical treatment; and a moratorium on executions.9 De Klerk also 
indicated that he would free ANC leader Nelson Mandela, perhaps 
the world's most famous political prisoner, after twenty-seven years 
in jail. \0 The ANC held preliminary meetings with the government 
and set up offices throughout the country.ll Other unbanned 
7 Scott Kraft, Sweeping Reforms in South Africa, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at AI. See also 
South Africa'S New Era: Excerpts from Add,-ess by De Klerk on Change, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, 
at A6 [hereinafter Add,-ess on Change]; Christopher S. Wren, De Klerk Weighs Change in 
Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1990, at A3. 
8 See generally TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1945 (1983). 
" Kraft, supra note 7, at A I O. 
10 [d.; see FATIMA MEER, HIGHER THAN HOPE: THE AUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY OF NELSON 
MANDELA (1990); South Africa's New Era: Around the World, Praise and Celebration, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb_ 12, 1990, at AI6 (on Mandela's release). 
II John Carlin, Leaders of ANC Readyfor Talks, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 17, 1990, at I. 
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groups also increased organization efforts. 12 In June, De Klerk 
announced the lifting of the four-year-old state of emergency fdr 
all of South Africa except Natal; months later, De Klerk also re-
pealed the state of emergency for Natal. 13 
Many came to believe the promise of De Klerk's February 
speech that "henceforth, everybody's political points of view will be 
tested against their realism, their workability and their fairness .... 
The time for negotiation has arrived."14 Graffiti in some African 
townships even proclaimed, "Viva Comrade De Klerk!"15 Euphoria 
quickly evaporated, however, as people recognized that the pillars 
of apartheid legislation-the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, the 
Group Areas Act, and the Population Registration Act-remained 
intact. 16 At the same time, the government steadfastly refused to 
release prisoners sentenced for offenses committed on behalf of 
political organizationsP By year's end, South Africa was close to 
total collapse as Africans, allegedly with police complicity, brutalized 
and murdered each other throughout the country in conflicts fueled 
by urban/rural, class, and ethnic tensions. 18 
The February 1991 opening of Parliament brought further 
changes . .De Klerk announced his intention to dismantle apartheid 
legislation. 19 Because blacks remained without the vote, however, 
the rescission of the legislation did not alter the balance of power 
in South Africa. The NP remained firmly in control of the country, 
commanding the allegiance of the largest and most sophisticated 
military force in Africa.20 In the hours following the speech, more 
than 30,000 police took part in a nationwide crackdown in which 
12 See Fred Bridgland, Waiting fm· the Great lndaba, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 1990, at 
13 ("Indaba" refers to a traditional meeting). 
IS Christopher S. Wren, South Africa Ends Emergency Decree in Three of Four Provinces, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 1990, at AI; Christopher S. Wren, De Klerk Lifts Emergency Rule in Natal 
Province, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1990, at A3. 
14 Address on Change, supra note 7, at A6. 
15 Some also shouted such slogans when De Klerk visited African townships. John Carlin, 
Township Mirrors South Africa'S Problems, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 8, 1990, at 15; Scott Kraft, De 
Klerk Tours Soweto: Unrest Kills 36, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at A4; Patti Waldmeir & Philip 
Gawith, South African Troops Fire on Crowd After Hostel Clash, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1990, at 7. 
16 Kraft, supra note 7, at A12. This legislation, often referred to collectively as the 
cornerstones or pillars of apartheid, is described in LEONARD M. THOMPSON & ANDREW 
PRIOR, SOUTH AFRICAN POLITICS 20-69 (1982); see also THOMPSON, supra note 5. 
17 Kraft, supra note 7, at AI. 
18 See Twenty-Six Die in South Africa in New Factional Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1990, at 
A8. 
19 Christopher S. Wren, South Africa Moves to Scrap Apartheid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1991, 
at AI. 
20 See id. 
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more than 11,000 people were arrested. 21 This allowed the NP to 
enter any negotiations over the future of the country from a posi-
tion of strength. The NP quickly rejected ANC calls for an interim 
government to be selected by a constituent assembly of major po-
litical groupings. 22 
B. Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) 
The NP, ANC, and Inkatha23 continued to express their desire 
for talks about change against a backdrop of increasing violence in 
the black community.24 The ANC asserted that the deteriorating 
conditions were not merely the result of black animosities, but were 
instead being orchestrated by a "third force" operating either under 
government auspices or with government approva1.25 After consid-
erable public outcry, De Klerk appointed a commission of inquiry 
into the violence, which became known as the Goldstone Commis-
sion, named after the judge who presided over it.26 In September 
1991, some saw grounds for cautious optimism with regard to the 
violence when representatives of the government, the ANC, and 
Inkatha signed the National Peace Accord to end violence among 
their supporters.27 As a precondition for talks with the government, 
the ANC abandoned the armed struggle in August 1991.28 It did 
not, however, disband its military wing29 despite the government's 
continued insistence on this condition.30 
The NP, in an effort to produce a settlement favorable to its 
interests, agreed to negotiate with the ANC and other political 
21 Pretoria Assailed on Police Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at A6. 
22 Christopher S. Wren, South Africans Headed for Multiparty Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
1991, at A9. 
23 Inkatha is formally known as the Inkatha Freedom Party, or IFP. 
24 Christopher S. Wren, Pretoria Examines Roots of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at 
AlO. 
25Id. 
26Id. Judge Richard J. Goldstone sat on the Appellate Division, South Africa's highest 
court. See also Bill Keller, Cape Tount Journal: In a Wary Land, the Judge is Trusted (To a Point), 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,1993, at A4. 
27 John Battersby, South Africa'S De Klerk Floats Plan for Transition, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONI-
TOR, Sept. 20, 1991, at 6; Christopher Munnion, Pretoria Army on March to Reform, DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 23, 1991, at 11. 
28 Christopher S. Wren, Pretoria Presses Mandela's Group to Disband Army and Yield Arms, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1992, at A9. 
29 The ANC military wing is known as "Umkhonto we Sizwe," or "Spear of the Nation." 
THOMPSON & PRIOR, supra note 16, at 197. 
30 Wren, supra note 28, at A9. 
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parties that wished to participateY The forum, known as the Con-
vention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), included rep-
resentatives from nineteen political parties.32 The perception Pre-
toria sought to create-that CODESA was a vigorous, multi-party 
open discussion-was illusory. Other parties, on either the left3:l or 
right,34 with the potential to disrupt the democratization process or 
undermine a new democratic order chose not to attend.35 
On December 21, 1991, seventeen of the nineteen parties36 
signed the Declaration of Intent.37 The Declaration provided that 
CODESA would "set in motion the process of drawing up and 
establishing a constitution"38 that would guarantee that South Africa 
would be "a united, democratic, non-racial and non-sexist state,"39 
with a constitution as the supreme law and "an independent, no'n-
31 See id. 
32 Text of Declaration of Intent by South Africa Convention, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1991, at A14 
[hereinafter Declaration of Intent]. 
33 Especially the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party, 
and the Azanian People's Organization. 
The willingness of the current PAC leadership to negotiate with the De Klerk government 
has alienated many young Africans who have joined the PAC, the ANC's main rival. Unlike 
the ANC, the PAC has historically been more nationalist in orientation, rejecting the ANC's 
willingness to find accommodation with whites. 
Regarding the South African Communist Party, the Communists did in fact have rep-
resentation at CODESA because many of its members are also prominent in the ANC. On 
the Communist Party, see generally LODGE, supra note 8. 
Further to the left of the PAC, the strongly nationalist Azanian People's Organization 
(AZAPO) has indicated that it will negotiate with whites only in the context of a constituent 
assembly. 
34 Notably the Conservative Party, which many believe enjoys widespread support from 
the members of the security forces and civil service, and.a host of ultra-rightwing, neo-Nazi 
groups. 
35 Except for the Democratic Party, a white group slightly to the left of NP but without 
broad backing, the other 14 parties were essentially NP puppets that owed their existence to 
Pretoria's largesse and had negligible support from the populace. Among these were the 
Coloured and Indian parties in the segregated chambers of Parliament-parties created by 
the government in what quickly became a failed effort to co-opt the sections of the population 
which those parties represent. Also present were the parties from the African homelands in 
which Pretoria claimed that Africans had the right to self-government and self-determination 
and went so far as to grant four of them fictional independence recognized by no other state. 
See Bill Schiller, Zulu Leader to Boycott South Africa Unity Talks, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 1991, 
at A3. 
36 The exceptions were the Inkatha Freedom Party and the party representing the quasi-
independent homeland of Bophuthatswana. The party from the quasi-independent home-
land of the Ciskei initially refused to sign but then reversed its position. 
37 Declaration of Intent, supra note 32, at A 14. See also Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa, Declaration of Intent, Dec. 20, 1991, reprinted in S. AFR. CONSULATE GEN., N.Y., THIS 
WK. IN S. AFR., Dec. 18-23, 1991, at 1. 
38 Declaration of Intent. supra note 32, § 5, at A14. 
39Id. § 5(a). 
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racial and impartial judiciary"40 to interpret that constitution. In 
addition, the parties subscribed to the ideas that South Africa would 
be a multi-party democracy with universal adult suffrage, a common 
voters' roll, and a basic electoral system based on proportional rep-
resentation.41 They also agreed upon "a separation of powers be-
tween the legislature, executive and judiciary with appropriate 
checks and balances."42 All residents were to enjoy "human rights, 
freedoms and civil liberties . . . protected by an entrenched and 
justiciable Bill of Rights and a legal system that guarantees equality 
of all before the law. "43 The diversity of languages, cultures, and 
religions of the people of South Africa also was to be recognized.44 
At the CODESA meeting, in what observers immediately con-
strued as a statement in favor of an interim government, De Klerk 
announced, "[ w]e are convinced it is in the best interest of South 
Africa and all its people for us to institute expeditiously, as a first 
phase, a government that is broadly representative of the whole 
population."45 Details regarding an interim government, however, 
were not forthcoming from NP leaders.46 Two days later, De Klerk 
rejected the notion that the existing constitution would be sus-
pended while a transitional government operating free of consti-
tutional control ruled the countryY He also denied that he had 
announced a plan for an interim government.48 
Despite lack of specificity over the question of an interim gov-
ernment, working groups that had organized themselves at the 
CODESA meeting moved ahead on pressing legal, political, and 
social issues. The entire process created considerable consternation 
and, often, resentment among whites, many of whom had long 
demanded that any new constitution be ratified by the white elec-
torate.49 Accordingly, on March 17, 1992, in an effort to show that 
he had broad support for his initiatives, De Klerk staged a refer-
endum among white voters. They were asked to respond "yes" or 
4°Id. § 5(b). 
41Id. § 5(c). 
42/d. § 5(d). 
43 [d. § 5(f). 
44 [d. § 5(e). 
45 Chris Erasmus, South Africa Holds Historic Meeting, USA TODAY, Dec. 21, 1991, at A4. 
46 See id. 
47 Agenda: South Africa De Klerk [nteroiewed on CODESA Session and Change of Authority 
(SABC television broadcast, Dec. 24, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File. 
40 [d. 
49 See Tony Freemantle, A Day of Voting, A Night of Waiting in South Africa, Hous. CHRON., 
Mar. 18, 1992, at AI (conservatives hold to system of separate development). 
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"no" to the question, "Do you support the continuation of the 
reform process which the State President began on February 2, 
1990, and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotia-
tion?"50 With an 87.6% voter turnout, 68.7% voted in favor of De 
Klerk's policies51 in spite of a vigorous campaign by the official 
parliamentary opposition Conservative Party, and perhaps also out 
of fear that a "no" vote would plunge the country into civil war. De 
Klerk's ostensible victory cleared the way for negotiations to pro-
ceed. 
On April 6, 1992, after three weeks of negotiating, the parties 
to CODESA were unable to reach an accord on the first stage of 
political transition. 52 Although they agreed that the current phase 
of negotiations would end with the election of an interim authority, 
there was no consensus over the power of the executive until that 
time. Indeed, the ANC and the NP offered contradictory propos-
als. 53 On April 23, De Klerk proposed that there be an interim 
elected executive council to replace his presidential position. 54 The 
ANC had no immediate reaction.55 
The second plenary session of CODESA, dubbed CODESA II, 
convened on May 15 and 16, 199~, but deadlocked over key issues.56 
The NP and ANC were unable to reach agreement on the per-
centage of votes required for decisions by the proposed interim 
assembly about regional borders, government powers, and various 
regional issues.57 Although the government insisted that there be a 
50 South African Whites OK Plan to Share Power with Blacks, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 18, 
1992, at AI. 
51 Christopher S. Wren, South African Whites Ratifj De Klerk's Move to Negotiate with Blacks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1992, at AI. The vote was 1,925,065 in favor and 875,676 against. 
Closing the Book on Apartheid, S. AFR. UPDATE, EMBASSY OF S. AFR., No.2, 1992, at 1. 
52 See Christopher Munnion, "Mixed Element" Plan to Rule South Africa, DAILY TELEGRAPH, 
Apr. 29, 1992, at 13. 
53 Id. The government favored a constitution-making body consisting of an elected 
bicameral transitional parliament acting under a transitional constitution. The lower house 
was to be popularly elected while the upper house was to have representation weighted in 
favor of minority parties. 
The ANC sought a unicameral alternative with three checks against the ability of the 
majority to impose its will on the minority. These were that the constitution be drafted within 
the scope of the CODESA principles, the constituent assembly be elected through a system 
of proportional representation favoring smaller parties, and the constitution be accepted by 
a two-thirds majority. See generally Liz Sly, Mandela Says No to Interim Plan, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 
26, 1992, at 8. 
54 Phillip van Niekerk, De Klerk Offers New Presidency, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1992, at AI. 
55Id. 
56 David B. Ottaway, South African Talks Fail to End Deadlock, WASH. POST, May 17, 1992, 
at A27. 
57Id. 
1993] HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS FROM A PREDECESSOR REGIME 207 
seventy-five percent majority for such decisions, the ANC had been 
willing to accept a seventy percent vote on regional issues.58 Never-
theless, both sides expected that CODESA committees would con-
tinue work on the problems afflicting the country. 59 The govern-
ment and the ANC also agreed to work on drafting an interim 
constitution. 60 
The process, however, soon collapsed. The ANC alleged that 
on June 17, 1992, Inkatha Freedom Party members, abetted by 
government security forces, killed forty-five ANC supporters in 
Boipatong township.61 De Klerk denied such accusations and asked 
that the Goldstone Commission add the Boipatong massacre to its 
investigative agenda.62 The ANC, unsatisfied with De Klerk's ac-
tions, withrlrew from the negotiation process.63 
C. International Community Involvement 
Speaking at a United Nations Security Council emergency 
meeting over the Boipatong massacre, Mandela called for a per-
manent U.N. special envoy who would investigate the causes of the 
violence and "provide the council with information for further 
measures to end the violence, inciuding continuous monitoring of 
the siqlation."64 In response, the United Nations sent former United 
States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance on a ten day mission aimed 
at persuading the government and the ANC to resume talks.65 By 
the time he arrived, the ANC was demanding, as a precondition 
for further talks, that the government accept unconstrained major-
ity rule.66 
58Id. Earlier, the two groups had virtually reached a compromise on a 70% majority on 
other issues with the exception of bill of rights provisions for which they had accepted a 
higher percentage. Id. The ANC threatened mass action in order to put pressure on the 
government. Id. 
59Id. 
60 Id. 
6\ David B. Ottaway, De Klerk's Call for Talks With ANC Is Turned Doom, WASH. POST, June 
25, 1992, at A33. Boipatong township is located south of Johannesburg. Id. 
62Id. 
63 John Battersby, Growing Violence, Stalled Talks Dim Prospects for South Africa, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, June 22, 1992, at I. Nelson Mandela described the negotiations at this point 
as "completely in tatters." Id. 
64 John M. Goshko, PermanentU.N. Presence in South Africa Sought, WASH. POST, July 16, 
1992, at AI. 
65 David B. Ottaway, Vance to Open Talks Today to Break South Africa Impasse, WASH. POST, 
July 22, 1992, at A26. 
66 /d. Vance's journey coincided with the second day of the ANC's mass-action campaign 
of strikes, marches, and the occupation of government buildings-all aimed at forcing the 
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The ANC and its allies organized a general strike on August 3 
and 4, 1992, as part of a "campaign for democracy."67 A team of 
ten U.N. monitors observed the strike, which was marred by inci-
dents of violence resulting in forty deaths around the country.68 
The operation was the first time that a U.N. team monitored a 
general strike.69 Because much of the economy was paralyzed by 
the strike, both sides knew that such mass action could not be 
maintained for more than a couple of days. Thus, the strike posed 
little threat to the NP government's hold on power.70 On August 5, 
1992, some 50,000 blacks converged on the Union buildings, the 
seat of government in Pretoria, where Nelson Mandela called for 
the formation of a government of national unity as "an urgent and 
critical step" necessary for progress in the suspended constitutional 
negotiations with the government.71 Later that day, De Klerk indi-
cated that there was "no fundamental difference of opinion" be-
tween the two groups and that he was "prepared to sit down to-
morrow" for negotiations during a proposed two-day bush retreat.72 
Shortly thereafter, the government and the ANC reportedly 
were discussing a general amnesty plan, put forward by the United 
Nations, to restart the move toward an interim government.73 More-
over, the U.N. role continued to grow: Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, favoring a return to the bargaining table, proposed 
in a report to the Security Council that the United Nations should 
station thirty observers in South Africa to bolster the National Peace 
Accord.74 The report also called upon the government to give the 
government to make concessions. The campaign, begun in early July, did not crescendo into 
the hoped-for "Operation Exit" that would be powerful enough to force the De Klerk 
government from power by August. Id. 
67 Banditry Versus Politics, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 1992, at 32. 
68 David B. Ottaway, ANe, South African Government Dispute Meaning of Strike, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 5, 1992, at A25. 
69 Id. Some speculated that the team's presence would lay the groundwork for a semi-
permanent U.N. role in curbing the violence. Id. 
70 See id. 
71 David B. Ottaway, 50,000 Join ANe Rally at De Klerk's Offices, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 
1992, at A33. 
72 Id.; John Battersby, South African Government and ANe Pondering General Amnesty Plan, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 7, 1992, at 1. De Klerk indicated that the government had 
already resumed talks with the ANC on certain issues. 
73 Battersby, supra note 72, at 1. Under the plan, security force members who had been 
involved in actions against the ANC and anti-apartheid activists were to receive blanket 
immunity. The plan also sought the freedom of 420 captives claimed by the ANC to be 
political prisoners. Id. 
74 John Battersby, South African Leader Is Set to Allow Security Probe, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON-
ITOR, Aug. 10, 1992, at 6. 
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Goldstone Commission greater powers of investigation into the 
causes of violence.75 
Although the government accepted both U.N. recommenda-
tions, violence in South Africa continued to rise.76 The ANC still 
refused to negotiate on the grounds that the government tolerated 
attacks on its members by supporters of its long-time rival Inkatha.77 
Additionally, the ANC received little support from the Goldstone 
Commission, which had issued a report on the causes of violence 
that placed primary blame on the ANC and Inkatha, and found no 
evidence of government complicity.78 Nevertheless, escalating vio-
lence would soon bring a confrontation between the government 
and the ANC. 
On September 7, 1992, a massacre of some thirty unarmed 
peaceful ANC demonstrators by Ciskeian troops led to an agree-
ment between the ANC and the government to hold a summit on 
violence.19 When the two sides met at the end of September in 
eight-hour closed-door talks, they agreed to place a ban on the 
carrying of cultural weapons80 and pledged to increase security at 
single-sex migrant workers' hostels81 from which many violent in-
cidents were launched.82 The spirit of cooperation between the 
government and the ANC, however, was quickly dampened as In-
katha leader Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi rejected Inkatha partic-
ipation in future negotiations because of the perception that the 
concessions unfairly targeted his group.83 Buthelezi's behavior also 
raised the chances of violence by his supporters.84 
751d. 
76 See Paul Taylor, South Africa'S Bitter Loss of Hope, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 1992, at AI. By 
September, an average of more than eight people a day were dying in the violence. This 
figure is triple that experienced in the country during the years of bitter civil unrest from 
1984 to 1990.ld. 
77 Id. 
7" David B. Ottaway, Judge Blasts ANC, Rival on Violence, WASH. POST, May 29, 1992, at 
A25. 
79 John Battersby, South Africa Summit Breaks Long Impasse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 
28. 1992. at 7. The South African government requested the U.N. to help end the violence 
and restart negotiations. The U.N. agreed to send a special envoy within 24 hours of receiving 
the request. Ross Dunn, Pretoria, ANC Prepare for Summit on Violence, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Sept. 14, 1992. at 3. In the meantime, 50 U.N. monitors had already begun to arrive in the 
country to monitor the violence. Id. To pave the way for the talks, the South African 
government conceded to the ANC demand of releasing 150 ANC prisoners. Battersby, supra, 
at 7. 
"0 Spears, axes, and other weapons favored by Inkatha members. 
"' Often populated by rural Zulu loyal to Inkatha. 
"" Battersby, supra note 79, at 7. 
"" Id. 
"4 See id. 
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By this time, the international community was becoming in-
creasingly involved in efforts to stop the violence in the country 
and to ensure a smooth transition to democracy. In addition to the 
U.N. monitors, teams from the World Council of Churches, the 
European Community, the Commonwealth, and the Organization 
of African Unity were either beginning operations or planning to 
begin them in the near future. 85 
D. National Party Government Measures-The Further Indemnity Act 
The government and the ANC agreed to meet at a two-day 
"bush summit" at the end of October 1992.86 By then, commentators 
argued that the ANC favored either bilateral or multiparty 
negotiations8i and that the government was interested in a power-
sharing arrangement with the ANC.88 The planned summit stalled 
on the issues of power-sharing and a decentralized federal govern-
ment.89 Compounding the difficulties, the Goldstone Commission 
damaged De Klerk's credibility when it revealed that top military 
officers had been involved in a campaign to discredit the ANC.90 
Seizing upon the government's weakness, the ANC offered power-
sharing with the government for a five-year period before the im-
plementation of black majority rule. 91 
In the midst of the negotiations, De Klerk introduced an am-
nesty bill into Parliament just as testimony before the Goldstone 
Commission alleged police involvement and complicity.92 Publicly 
85 Arthur Gavshon, SA Accepts EC Offer to Retrain Policemen, WKLY. MAIL, Sept. 25-Oct. 
I, 1992, at 4. 
86 Billy Paddock, Government and ANC Head for the Bush for Next Round of Negotiations, 
Bus. DAY, Oct. 2, 1992, at I. 
87 See id. at 1-2. 
88 Phillip van Niekerk, Still Searching for a Heart of Stone, WKLY. MAIL, Oct. 16-22, 1992, 
at 19; see also John Battersby, South Africa Impasse Prompts Call for Foreign Mediator, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 22, 1992, at 7. 
89 John Battersby, Disclosures of Covert Military Activities Weaken De Klerk in South African 
Impasse, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1992, at I. 
90 Id. 
91 John Battersby, ANC Offers Power Sha1ing to Speed South Africa Transition, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 1992, at I. 
92 See Controversial South Africa Amnesty Plan OKd, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1992, at CII; Panel 
in South Africa Backs De Klerk's Plan for Amnesty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1992, at A4. See also 
National Party Suffers Humiliating Defeat Over Attempts to Cover Up State "Terrorism" with Amnesty 
Bill, S. AFR. REp., Oct. 23, 1992, at 2 [hereinafter Amnesty Bill]. De Klerk insisted that he 
knew of no one in the government engaged in nefarious activities. Id. 
The bill gave the State President sweeping powers of indemnity. /d. at 1-2. The amnesty 
bill immediately became a very contentious issue; consequently, when it appeared unlikely 
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expressing support for the amnesty measure at the Transvaal Law 
Society's centenary celebration, De Klerk said that the bill's purpose 
was to "level the playing field" between the government and its 
opponents,93 Furthermore, he insisted that he did not know of any 
state official who committed any crime, and that the amnesty bill 
was not "aimed at clearing the decks for intransigent government 
which participated behind the scenes in all sorts of criminal activi-
ties."94 
Although the bill failed to receive the necessary majorities in 
the segregated tricameral Parliament,95 it passed in the NP-domi-
nated, white House of Assembly, but over the objections of the 
Democratic Party which insisted that there be public disclosure of 
the behavior of those indemnified.96 It also passed readily in the 
Coloured House of Representatives despite criticism from the mi-
nority Labour Party.97 Nevertheless, Solidarity, the majority party 
in the Indian House of Delegates, was steadfast in its refusal to 
ratify the bill.98 Consequently, De Klerk overcame this rebuff by 
resorting to the President's Council,99 and enacted the Further In-
demnity Act on November 9, 1992.100 
The Act provides the State Pr~sident with the authority to grant 
amnesty to those who "advised, directed, commanded, ordered or 
performed" any act with a political object. lOi Although the Act 
applies to actions committed before October 8, 1990, a discretionary 
clause gives the State President the power to enlarge the period as 
he or she deems appropriate. 102 The Act proscribes both criminal 
that the bill would be ratified before the special session of Parliament, the government 
extended the session one more day. [d. at 2. 
9' Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 2. 
94 [d.; President De Klerk Denies Ulterior Motive for Amnesty Legislation, (BBC Broadcast, Oct. 
22, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File. 
95 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
96 Parliament Holds Special Session, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIG., Oct. 22, 1992, at 
804GI, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File. 
97 [d. 
98 [d. 
99 The President's Council is the Parliamentary body which resolves legislative disputes 
among the three houses. The Council is dominated by the National Party with 35 votes in 
the 60 member body, a 58% majority. Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 2-3. The Council had 
last been called upon by De Klerk's predecessor, P.W. Botha, when he used it in 1986 to 
enact security legislation opposed by the Labour Party. [d. at 2. In 1989, the Council itself 
suggested that it be restructured. [d. at 3. See also Joe Castro, South Africa's·De Klerk Signs Bill 
Giving Him Right to Grant Amnesty, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Nov. 6, 1992, at C2. 
100 Act No. 163-92, Further Indemnity Act (Nov. 9, 1992). 
101/d. § 3(1). 
102 [d. § 12. 
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proceedings and civil suits. 103 Instead, those seeking indemnity must 
apply to the National Council on Indemnity; 104 and under the leg-
islation, the Council proceedings are to be secret. 105 Moreover, both 
its members and those present must take an oath of secrecy. 106 
The ANC opposed the legislation, which it considered to be an 
effort by the government to pardon police, military, and security 
force members implicated in the commission of heinous acts. 107 
Furthermore, the ANC was adamant that criminals could not par-
don themselves and indicated that it would not abide by the legis-
lation if the ANC came to power. 108 The organization also worked 
to bolster opposition to the bill by releasing a report, conducted by 
an ANC commission of inquiry, of atrocities committed in ANC-
run refugee camps in Zambia, Angola, Tanzania, and Uganda. 109 
The commission was composed of three lawyers--one indepen-
dent and two ANC members-and was appointed in March of 1992 
after repeated allegations by former refugees of widespread torture 
and other forms of mistreatment. 110 The findings showed that com-
mitted acts included torture, which contravened both the ANC's 
code of conduct and former ANC President Oliver Tambo's 1980 
pledge to honor the Geneva Conventions. III The commission 
warned that the ANC would suffer from continued accusations, 
malaise, and recriminations unless the organization expanded upon 
the investigation. I 12 Thus, it recommended that the ANC "cleanse" 
itself of those who had committed atrocities and urged that the 
guilty be barred from positions of authority.ll3 Recognizing that its 
own membership was weighted in favor of the ANC, the commission 
urged that a more independent commission of inquiry be formed 
to explore allegations of disappearance imd murder, and to bring 
103Id. § 3(2). 
104Id. § 4(1). 
105 /d. § 10(7). 
106/d. Any contravention of the secrecy provision is a crime punishable by a fine or a 
one-year prison term. /d. § 10(9). 
107 Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 2. The complicated relations among the police, military, 
and security forces in South Africa is described in Lynn Berat, Conscientious Objection in South 
Africa: Governmental Paranoia and the Law of Conscription, 22 V AND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 127 
(1989). 
108 Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 2. 
109 AXC Wins and Loses with Honor Camps Report, S. AFR. REP., Oct. 23, 1992, at 3 
[hereinafter HorTor Camps Report]. 
11') See id. 
III Id. at 4. 
112ld. 
I!:lId. at 3. 
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those responsible to justice. Furthermore, the commission urged 
that victims receive compensation for their ill-treatment as well as 
psychological, medical, and educational assistance. 1I4 Acknowledg-
ing these recommendations, Mandela stated that "as a leadership, 
we accept ultimate responsibility for not adequately monitoring and 
therefore eradicating such abuses."115 He pledged that the ANC 
would immediately examine the recommendations and act appro-
priately. 
E. The "Bush Summit" of 1992 
In late 1992, the ANC remained optimistic about the date and 
agenda for the government-ANC "bush summit."116 On November 
18, 1992, the ANC formally adopted a discussion document entitled 
"Strategic Perspectives" that supported a possible power-sharing 
arrangement with the NP.ll7 The document recognized the desir-
ability of a general amnesty for security force and civil service 
members because such individuals had the power to obstruct the 
transition. liB Five days later, however, Buthelezi announced that 
Inkatha would not accept any date set for the establishment of an 
interim government if the date were to be decided bilaterally be-
tween the government and the ANC.1I9 His statement did not stop 
De Klerk from announcing on November 26, 1992, that he wanted 
a fully representative government of national unity in place no later 
than the first half of 1994.120 In response, the ANC criticized De 
Klerk for anticipating the outcome of the pending bilateral talks 
and for refusing to accede to its prior demand of elections before 
the end of 1993. 121 
At the beginning of December, Buthelezi announced that he 
had plans for a new constitution in Natal province, an area including 
the K waZulu homeland, that would result in an autonomous state. 122 
114Id. 
115Id. 
116 Phillip Van Niekerk, This Isn't a Soap, FW. It's For Real, WKLY. MAIL, Dec. 4-10, 1992, 
at 2.1). 
117 ANC's "Strategic Perspective" Paper on Negotiations, (BBC Broadcast, Nov. 19, 1992), 
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Papers File. 
12. 
118Id. 
119 Christopher Munnion, Zulus Block Pretoria Deal, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 24, 1992, at 
120 Barry Streek, FW Sets Date, CAPE TIMES, Nov. 27, 1992, at 1. 
121 See id. 
122 Chris Whitfield, Ulundi's Shock Plan to Go It Alone, CAPE TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at 1. 
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He insisted that he would proceed with his plan regardless of what 
happened in other negotiations. 123 The ANC rejected the move, 
saying it came "as a bolt from the blue," and amounted to a "drastic 
departure from the constitutional process."124 The central NP gov-
ernment responded cautiously, suggesting that the proposal be dis-
cussed during the multi-party talks. 125 Although Buthelezi's plan 
pointed to the potential for a fractured South Africa, the threat was 
submerged momentarily by attacks on whites in the Eastern Cape. 126 
The Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), the military wing 
of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), claimed responsibility.127 In 
a statement to the South African Press Association, APLA declared 
war on all white South Africans. 128 The government then broke off 
talks with the PAC, which in a meeting with the government had 
committed itself to peace, until the PAC clarified its position on 
APLA's actions. 129 
When the government and the ANC finally held their much-
awaited "bush summit," they agreed on the urgency of reviving the 
multilateral negotiation process early in the new year, the stream-
lining of CODESA, and nonracial elections for a transitional gov-
ernment/constituent assembly by late 1993 or early 1994. They also 
agreed to convene another "bush summit" in January of 1993 to 
build upon the achievements of the December meeting. 130 More-
over, De Klerk said in an interview that he would ensure that 
progress with regard to constitutional reform would continue even 
if a multi-party forum failed to emerge. 131 He stated that he would 
continue with negotiations either bilaterally or in a smaller multi-
party forum. 
On top of the possibility of secession (orchestrated by Buthe-
lezi), rising violence to achieve it, increasing attacks by APLA, and 
12S See id. 
124 See id. 
1251d. 
126 Philippa Garson, Buthelezi's UDI Plan Could Fan Natal Violence, WKLY. MAIL, Dec. 4-
10, 1992, at 2; see Guy Jepson & Franz Kruger, King Killers: Unnamed and Unknoum, WKLY. 
MAIL, Dec. 4-10, 1992, at 4. The attacks resulted in five deaths. 
127 Jepson & Kruger, supra note 126, at 4. 
128 John Carlin, Black Group Declares War on South African Whites, INDEPENDENT, Dec. 8, 
1992, at 10. 
129 Michael Hamlyn, Pretoria Halts·Militants' Talks, THE TIMES (London), Dec. 9, 1992, at 
12. 
ISO Anthony Johnson, Big Three Agree on a Government of Unity, CAPE TIMES, Dec. 7,1992, 
at 1. 
lSI See id. 
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continued ANC-Inkatha strife, De Klerk made an announcement 
on December 19, 1992, that exacerbated the threats of insurrection 
within the military as well as threats of a campaign of right-wing 
terrorism. In contrast to his prior defense of the security forces, De 
Klerk dismissed or suspended twenty-three military officers, includ-
ing six generals, who were suspected of activities, including assas-
sination, aimed at thwarting racial reconciliation. 132 Although De 
Klerk's actions may be construed as a major concession to the ANC, 
which had demanded a purge of the military as a condition for the 
resumption of multi-party discussions, the danger exists that his 
actions will push increasing numbers of whites into the Conservative 
Party or extra-parliamentary groups to its right. 133 With such con-
trary and hostile forces at work, any new democratic government 
that emerges must move quickly to establish its own legitimacy both 
domestically and internationally. In so doing, it will have to deal 
with the issue of how to treat human rights violators from the days 
of NP rule. 
III. LEGITIMACY AND THE PRO~LEM OF PROSECUTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS VIOLATORS FROM PREDECESSOR REGIMES 
The rise of human rights as an important part of political 
discourse in the international sphere during the post-World War II 
era has recently been consolidated, at least rhetorically, in the many 
transitions to democracy around the globe. In making the claim 
that democracy and human rights are inseparable, proponents of 
democratic rule draw support from an ever-growing number of 
human rights instruments that have become part of the interna-
tionaljurisprudential corpus since the founding of the United Na-
tions nearly half a century ago. 134 Moreover, because of this evolu-
tion in international human rights practice, nation-states must 
comply with the norms enshrined in such documents if they wish 
to be considered full members of the international community. 
m Alan Cowell, De Klerk Concedes Military Had Role in Township Strife, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 1992, at 1. 
us See id. 
154 The United Nations Charter was the product of the Declaration by United Nations 
of January I, 1942, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of August 21-October 7, 1944, and 
the San Francisco Conference of April 25-26, 1945. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); 
THOMAS HOVET,JR. & ERICA HOVET, A CHRONOLOGY AND FACT BOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
1941-1979 vii, 1 (6th ed. 1979). 
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The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 provides that if human beings are not allowed to rebel 
against tyranny and oppression, then the rule of law must protect 
human rights. 135 Since the end of the Second World War, these 
basic human rights, largely a product of western jurisprudence, 
have been found frequently in constitutionally entrenched, justici-
able bills of rights. Beliefs in the primacy of the individual and his 
or her possession of certain inalienable rights, whether or not they 
are recognized by the polity, derive from notions of natural law that 
first found expression among the ancient Greeks. 136 Although pro-
ponents of natural law generally found themselves in the minority 
throughout much of western history, the brutality of World War II 
placed natural law concepts of human rights in the center of political 
attention. 137 
Today, the proponents of human rights do not universally 
agree upon their contents. There is a vigorous debate about the 
significance governments should accord different generations of 
rights-first-generation civil and political rights, second-generation 
social and economic rights, and third-generation solidarity rights-
and whether second- and third-generation rights are enforceable 
or merely morally compelling. 138 Clearly, the leaders of each new 
135 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. Al810, at 
71 (1948). See generally NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ITs ORIGIN, SIGNIFICANCE, ApPLICATION, AND INTERPRETATION (1958). 
On the concept of the rule oflaw, see ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 183-205 (10th ed. 1959). Ostensibly, the concept of the 
rule of law does not include rule fry law or the rule of law and order, frequent phrases used 
by authoritarian regimes the world over. South Africa has been no exception to this trend. 
See Lynn Berat, A New South Africa?: Prospects for an Africanist Bill of Rights and a Transformed 
Judiciary, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 467, 470-71 (1991). Rather, the rule of law refers 
to the idea that independent courts using fair procedures are to safeguard the basic rights 
of individuals such as equality before the law. 
136 See generally ].H.W. VERZIJL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(1968). Such ideas were embellished by Roman jurists; theologians and jurists of the Age of 
Exploration and beyond; and also by humanist philosophers such as John Locke, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. See, e.g., H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HIS-
TORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1972); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole trans., ].M. Dent 1973) (1913). 
137 The views of those who espoused natural law concepts with regard to the issue of 
sovereignty for indigenous peoples are described in LYNN BERAT, WALVIS BAY: DECOLONI-
ZATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-21 (1990). Naturalists believe that all peoples of the 
world share certain inalienable rights. [d. at 104. Positivists, on the other hand, deny this 
claim, based on the argument that force is the basis of all law. [d. at 104, 108. 
138 This debate rages in South Africa among those pondering the contents of a Consti-
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democracy must decide for themselves, preferably in consultation 
with the populace, which generation or generations of rights will 
be recognized in their society. In the long run, that choice-
grounded as it must be in the society's political history, struggles, 
and aspirations-will affect the extent of legitimacy the people of 
that nation-state confer on the new regime. 
In a democracy, legitimate legal orders derive their force from 
authority given over by the people, whose compliance with the law 
obviates the need for coercion from some external authority. In 
such societies, the people adhere to the laws because they have 
taken part in the drafting of laws. In addition, the citizens feel that 
the legal system is truly their own because it responds to their wishes 
regarding the future direction the country is to take and offers 
them recourse when they are aggrieved. 139 Indeed, the psycholog-
ical aspect of legitimacy is especially important because as long as 
people believe in the sanctity of the institutions or in their effec-
tiveness-real or imagined-the country will not be thrown into 
chaos. 
Once democratic transitions occur, many within the society who 
suffered at the hands of the previous rulers may make demands 
for the prosecution of their former leaders and their agents who 
persecuted civilians. These aggrieved individuals may equate the 
swift action of the new regime against those who committed atroc-
ities as a measure of its democratic sincerity. Failure of the new 
regime to take quick, decisive steps may irreparably harm its quest 
for popular legitimacy. This fact, however, must be tempered by 
the realization that many transitions to democracy do not represent 
a complete break from the past. 140 In some cases, for example, 
members of security forces responsible for heinous behavior under 
the old order remain in influential positions. Indeed, their contin-
ued influence, especially in the form of the threat they represent 
for the disruption of the new order, may be so great as to in-
duce the new leaders to grant them immunity from prosecution. 141 
Recognition of these realities, which may render prosecution 
tution for a democratic polity. The bill of rights issue is discussed at length in Berat, supra 
note 135, at 469-84. 
139 This has not been the case in South Africa. See Second Court Statement, 1964, reprinted 
in NELSON MANDELA, THE STRUGGLE Is My LIFE 176-82 (1986). 
140 See generally Berat & Shain, Evening the Score, supra note 2. 
'-II Lawrence Weschler, Afterword, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON 92 (1989) 
[hereinafter STATE CRIMES]. Granting such immunity or amnesty can be viewed as calculated 
"to enforce total amnesia regarding those crimes." 1d. 
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impractical,142 forms a significant component of arguments against 
prosecution. Critics of prosecution also often express the fear that 
new and fragile democracies are vulnerable to social animosities 
created by prosecutions. 143 Additionally, there is the trepidation that 
prosecutions that begin as well-intentioned efforts to bring the most 
flagrant violators of human rights to justice may deteriorate into 
witch-hunts and create a pervasive atmosphere of recrimination, 
thereby destroying the newly developing social fabric. 
These valid concerns are countered by the argument that fail-
ure to prosecute may be even more counterproductive. For exam-
ple, the granting of amnesty may not encourage national reconcil-
iation, but only increase tension. 144 Thus, the "restoration of the 
universality of democratic institutions restores to citizens full mem-
bership in society. Criminal justice suppresses the differences be-
tween those who had control over other persons' lives and those 
whose existence was at their mercy."145 Moreover, such prosecutions 
may help bolster the legitimacy of the new regime by increasing 
people's belief in the ability of the new democratic institutions to 
render justice .146 
Prosecutions also diminish the feeling that certain individuals 
or groups are above the law, a transformation in perception nec-
essary for democratic institutions to acquire widespread legitimacy 
and to deter disruptions in the social order by perpetrators of state 
violence. To do less than prosecute may prove catastrophic for the 
long-term viability of the polity's new democratic institutions. 
Whether new democratic regimes opt for prosecution for reasons 
of retribution or deterrence or both, an appeal to international law 
will make prosecution easier by allowing fragile democratic regimes 
to justify their actions as necessary for full acceptance by the inter-
national community. 
142 Argentina and Uruguay provide two examples. Regarding Argentina, see jose Zala-
quett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable 
and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 141, at 43-44, 48-58. The Uruguayan 
situation is also described. Id. at 58-64. 
143 See generally id. 
144 jaime E. Malamud-Goti, Trying Violators of Human Rights: The Dilemma of Transitional 
Democratic Government, in STATE CRIMES, supra note 141, at 72-73. jaime Malamud-Goti is an 
ex-senior presidential advisor (1983-1987) to former Argentinian President Raul Alfonsin. 
145Id. at 81. 
146Id. "Institutional disapproval of official policies that resulted in the violation of human 
rights underlines the discontinuity between the previous regime and the transitional govern-
ment. Where transgressions were connected to the highest levels of governmental spheres, 
the criminal sentence dilutes any suspicion of continuity." Id. 
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IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS: INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
A. Individual Rights and Obligations in International Law 
While there has been growth in the rights of the individual 
under international law, there has been a concomitant rise in the 
duties of the individual. This has manifested itself in terms of the 
individual's relation to the community and to other individuals: each 
individual owes the community duties, and only in the community 
can the individual achieve his or her freest and fullest develop-
ment. 147 This development makes possible the prosecution of hu-
man rights violators from predecessor regimes. 148 
Given the multiplicity of political beliefs that espouse human 
rights and duties, it is not surprising that the question of individual 
duties and responsibilities under international law is one of the most 
vexing and controversial issues of our time. Traditional interna-
tionallaw furnishes a system of rules governing relationships among 
states; it also provides resolution to the majority of international 
disputes, even though some cases may not be resolvable through 
the application of legal rules. 149 According to the positivist doctrine 
147 See generally CARL AAGE N0RGAARD, THE POSITION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1962). Among the Romans, the individual was believed to have three duties 
towards other individuals: "to live honestly, not to injure another, and to give to each one 
that which belongs to him." The Enactments of Justinian: The Institutes, in II THE CIVIL LAw 5 
(S.P. Scott trans., AMS Press 1973) (1932). By the nineteenth century, the concept of duties 
found expression in the works of socialist theory. See, e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, 
MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (Samuel Moore trans., 1948). Socialist theory main-
tained that the class struggle eventually would yield a state and society replete with the unity 
of rights and duties. Hence, the main theoretical underpinning of the socialist theory of 
citizens' rights, in accord with the achievements of the class struggle and the new socio-
economic order, is the unity of citizen's rights and duties. Such rights reflect neither the 
relationship between the individual and society nor between an abstract "individual" and the 
state. Instead, the relationship derives from society organized in a state and the rights mirror 
the relationship between the state and its citizens. 
Capitalist-influenced theories also conceived of some linkage of rights and duties. The 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948 indicated that although 
human duties do not have the status of human rights, duties of a legal nature presuppose 
others of a moral nature that support them in principle and constitute their basis. American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, 9th Int'l Conf. of Am. States, 
Bogota, Supp. No. 43, at 133 (1949), in 6 ACTAS Y DOCUMENTAS 297-302 (1953). Thus, the 
legal duty to promote respect for human rights includes the legal duty to respect them. In 
the United States, duty is the correlative of right. Hence, whenever one person has a right, 
there is a corresponding duty on another person or upon the community. 
148 N0RGAARD, supra note 147, at 79-98 (individual as subject of duties and subject of 
rights), 173-303 (individual as subject of responsibility and subject of proceeding). 
149/d. 
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underpinning the nation-state system, because international law was 
not based on the consent of individuals but on that of states, the 
latter were the sole subject of international law. 150 Hence, interna-
tionallaw dealt almost exclusively with the conduct of states rather 
than their citizens. This meant that the individual is never directly 
a subject of international law. 151 It follows that if an individual is 
not the subject of international law, the individual is the object 
of it. 
Further, for the positivists, the individual had rights and obli-
gations in his or her own country or within the country of resi-
dence. 152 There the individual could sue and be sued, and commit 
crimes and be punished. Such behavior would be regulated by ~he 
provisions of public and private domestic law. Although private 
international law regulated relations with individuals from foreign 
states, it also was thought to be a part of national law. Following 
this logic, on an international plane, only the actions of states could 
be prosecuted rather than the actions of individuals, for the indi-
vidual could not commit international crimes but the state that did 
not restrain the individual from criminal actions could sometimes 
be held liable for damages. Hence, the sphere of international law 
was deemed to be entirely separate from that of national law. 153 
In some instances, however, the individual does have a duty 
under international law, either conventional or customary, to per-
form or refrain from performing various acts. 154 Although under 
international law individual rights that imply the duties of states are 
a relatively late development in jurisprudence, certain individual 
duties have existed for centuries. 155 International crimes were pun-
ishable long before notions of human rights enjoyed their present 
popularity; piracy, for example, has long been seen as a crime 
against international law, punishable by any state in which the of-
fender is seized. 156 Individuals who are members of the armed 
forces of belligerent states are criminally liable for violations of the 
[50Id. at 34-41. L. OPPENHEIM, I INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATISE ~ 13 (1955). 
[5[ See N0RGAARD, supra note 147, at 34-41. 
[52 See id. at 35, 39-41. 
[53 See id. 
[54 [d. at 41. 
[55Id. 
[56 See generally Draft Convention on Piracy, With Comment, in RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: PART IV (joseph W. Bingham reporter, 1932); PHILIP GOSSE, THE HISTORY OF PIRACY 
(1932). 
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international law of war and may be punished by other belliger-
ents. IS7 A state having custody of the offenders may impose sanc-
tions by the exercise of the state's jurisdiction rather than by any 
international procedure. ls8 
More recently, there has been an increase in the number of 
international criminal offenses for which there is individual liability. 
At the very end of World War II, the governments of the Soviet 
Union, France, Great Britain, and the United States signed an 
agreement that provided for the prosecution and punishment of 
the major Axis war criminals whose offenses had no singular geo-
graphic location. ls9 According to the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, a document annexed to the agreement, the ju-
risdiction of the Tribunal extended to individuals responsible for 
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, 
whether or not they violated the domestic law of the country in 
which they occurred and regardless of the proffered defense of 
obedience to superior orders.16o In view of these international in-
struments, the Nuremberg Tribunal's judgment of October 1, 1946, 
157 See generally MICHAEL BERNER ET AL., THE LAW OF WAR (Richard I. Miller ed., 1975); 
JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (2d ed. 1959). 
158 The indictment of German Emperor Wilhelm II in the Peace Treaty of Versailles 
began a move toward a wider concept of international responsibility. The Emperor was 
arraigned not on the grounds that he was responsible for war crimes committed on orders 
by members of the German forces, but for an offense against international morality and the 
sanctity of treaties. However, the Netherlands refused to surrender the Emperor to whom it 
had granted asylum. No trial occurred. See generally Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919,225 
Con sol. T.S. 188, arts. 227-47. 
159 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 
U.N.T.S.279. 
160 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAWS 109-19 (1965). The defendants had argued that international law was linked 
to the action of sovereign states and provided no punishment for individuals. They also 
maintained that where the act in question was an act of the state, those who performed it 
had no personal responsibility and were shielded by the doctrine of state sovereignty. The 
Tribunal rejected these arguments, maintaining that "international law imposes duties and 
liabilities upon individuals as well as upon states .... Crimes against international law are 
committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit 
such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced." International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172,220-21 (1947) [here-
inafter Nuremberg Judgment]. 
The trial of major Japanese war criminals was conducted upon the same principles. The 
tribunal at Tokyo, whose jurisdiction was similar to that of the Nuremberg Tribunal, ren-
dered its judgment on November 12, 1948, based upon the principles of the Nuremberg 
judgment. The functioning of the tribunals is examined in War and Neutrality, 15 ANN. DIG. 
356 (Int'l Military Tribunal for the Far East 1948) (japan). 
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rocked the foundations of positivist doctrine when it recognized 
individual responsibility for crimes against international law. 161 
The implications of this departure from positivist orthodoxy 
were profound. International law had begun to recognize the in-
dividual as an independent jural entity who would not only be liable 
as an individual for his or her actions, but also would have rights, 
derived from natural law, that existed independently of the state or 
states under whose jurisdiction he or she lived. 162 The individual 
would be capable of asserting those rights, when necessary, directly 
against states other than his or her own and without having to use 
his or her own as an intermediary. Lastly, an individual would be 
able to appeal directly to an international agency for protection and 
administration of justice, thus gaining international protection even 
against the individual's own state. The aim of this development was 
to make international law applicable ex propio vigore to individuals 
directly, and not only through the ordinary activity of states. 
B. Codification of International Human Rights 
1. United Nations Documents 
Cold War frictions made the creation of a permanent interna-
tional criminal court an impracticality. Nevertheless, the concept of 
direct responsibility of the individual for certain crimes under in-
ternationallaw was affirmed by the United Nations General Assem-
bly on December 11, 1946.163 The General Assembly also declared 
genocide a crime under international law for which the perpetrators 
were punishable. 164 Following this vein, the Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948,165 which 
passed in the same year as the non-binding Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,166 indicates that those committing offenses under 
it "shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible 
161 See generally NurembergJudg;ment, supra note 160; see also JOHN A. ApPLEMAN, MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (1954); ROBERT K. WOETZEL, THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1962). 
162 NORGAARD, supra note 147, at 174. 
16' Benjamin B. Ferencz, Current Developments: The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 674, 674 & n.2 (1981). 
164Id. at 674. 
165 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948,78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
166 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 135. 
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rulers, public officials or private individuals."167 The four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 conceive of criminal prosecutions, before na-
tional courts, of individuals accused of violations. 168 Indeed, uni-
versal jurisdiction-the concept that human rights violations com-
mitted in one country are the legitimate concern of other states-
has grown considerably since Nuremberg. 169 The United Nations 
has also defined, as offenses against peace and security of mankind, 
various other acts, including acts of aggression, which were crimes 
under international law. 170 
United Nations instruments also established the duties of the 
individual under international law.171 The reaffirmation of faith in 
the dignity and worth of the human person contained in the U.N. 
Charter172 also appeared in the Universal Declaration of Human 
RightS. 173 Articles 2 and 6 of that Declaration not only recognize 
the right of the individual to be granted the dignity of the human 
being, but also give the individual the fundamental duty of treating 
others likewise. 174 Article 29 of the Declaration also contains a pro-
vision explicitly establishing duties for the individual, noting that 
"[e]veryone has duties to the community."175 The obligations of the 
individual are manifested both in the International Covenants on 
Human Rights176 and the Optional Protocol to the International 
167 See Genocide Convention, supra note 165, art. 4. 
168 Conventions for the Protection of War Victims Concerning: I. Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field; II. Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; III. 
Treatment of Prisoners of War; and IV. Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 
12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
169 On universal jurisdiction, see generally Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction 
Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785 (1988). 
170 International crimes, unlike other crimes, are also an exception to the rule that "the 
character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country 
where the act is done." Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909». Domestic prosecutorial 
discretion or amnesty laws used by new governments to avoid prosecuting members of past 
regimes violate the country's international legal obligations. See Yoram Dinstein, International 
Criminal Law, 20 ISRAEL L. REV. 206, 225 (1985). 
171 See generally U.N. CHARTER; see also supra note 134. 
172Id. 
173 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 135. 
174Id. arts. 2, 6. 
175Id. art. 29. 
176 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res." 2200 (XXI), U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966) [hereinafter Political Rights]; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966); see also 6 I.L.M. 360-
83 (1967). 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 177 These developments show 
a trend in international law of increasing obligations imposed on 
individuals under international law even though the prosecution of 
international criminals continues to be the responsibility of states in 
the absence of an international criminal court. With both rights and 
duties under international law, individuals have a legal personality 
that flows partly from agreements between and among states that 
is sometimes capable of being exercised against states. This, how-
ever, is not a functional personality because it does not empower 
the individual to perform certain tasks assigned by states. Instead, 
the legal personality appears to derive from human needs and the 
social obligations of people to one another. . 
The positivist formula that states are subjects and individuals 
are objects of international law no longer corresponds to the present 
state of affairs. In reality, an international law of wider scope is 
necessary in order to serve new needs. At the present stage of the 
development of international law, however, individuals lack proce-
dural capacity to lay their claims before international courts or 
tribunals. Moreover, such claims can be entertained only at the 
instance of the state of which the individual is a national or, in 
certain circumstances, by the international institution of which he 
or she is a servant. Although there is a trend toward the granting 
of procedural capacity to the individual for certain well-defined 
rights, the enforcement of human rights and duties will occur in 
the legal and political systems of the state in which the individual 
resides. Absent effective ways of enforcing both international hu-
man rights and obligations in the international arena, the task re-
mains to those who urge their domestic governments both to honor 
these rights and to obtain redress for violations committed by those 
who once governed them, to promote human rights. In so doing, 
domestic courts may be able to justify prosecutions by relying on 
obligations found in international instruments to which the state is 
a party.17S 
177 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966); 
see also 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967). 
17. South Africa, a signatory to the U.N. Charter, is not yet party to any major interna-
tional human rights instruments. The ANC has indicated, however, that should it come to 
power it will ratify such treaties as part of the process of having the country shed its status 
as international pariah. With regard to the prosecution of human rights violators from the 
predecessor regime, ratification would raise problems of retroactivity that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. In addition to treaty obligations, a state may also have a duty to prosecute 
under customary international law. Thus, for example, there is substantial authority that the 
1993] HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS FROM A PREDECESSOR REGIME 225 
2. International Treaties 
A number of international treaties, dealing with a particular 
human right, require state parties to criminalize certain behavior; 
some treaties demand punishment of offenders. 179 A number of 
more modern treaties, however, go so far as to stipulate the means 
of domestic enforcement of specific human rights provisions. For 
example, the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,180 enumerates 
required legal steps for the suppression of such practices. 181 These 
provisions go far beyond the mere proscriptions of torture con-
tained in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights l82 and 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political RightS. 183 
Breaking with pure reliance upon criminal legal sanctions, the Con-
vention also requires states to provide civil remedies for torture 
victims. 184 
In contrast to the duty to punish, so clearly expressed in these 
specialized international instruments, various general human rights 
treaties on both the international and regional level do not demand 
that state parties punish those who violate the rights enumerated 
in the conventions. Instead, they give state parties discretion to 
practices of apartheid and racial discrimination are violations of the jus cogens--basic, fun-
damental, imperative, or overriding rules of international law, peremptory norms that "can-
not be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent customary 
rule of contrary effect." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 (4th 
ed. 1990). 
179 Examples of the former are the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966,60 V.N.T.S. 195, and the International CO{l-
vention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30,1973,1015 
V.N.T.S. 243. Examples of the latter are the Genocide Convention, supra note 165, the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 168, and the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 
7, 1956,266 V.N.T.S. 3. 
180 Opened for signature, Feb. 4, 1985, 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 [herein-
after Torture Convention]. 
181 However, even states not party to the Convention may have a duty to act, deriving 
from customary international law. See BROWNLIE, supra note 178, at 513. 
m Vniversal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 135. 
183 Political Rights, supra note 176. 
184 Torture Convention, supra note 180, art. 14. The Convention also provides for uni-
versal jurisdiction so that if the government of the state in which the offense occurred does 
not abide by its duty to prosecute, other states can take over the prosecution. [d. art. 5(2). 
Vniversal jurisdiction thus functions as a link between the jurisdiction exerted by an inter-
national tribunal, as furnished by the Nuremberg model, and the jurisdiction of domestic 
courts over human rights offenders. However, domestic jurisdiction exercised by courts of 
newly democratized states over human rights offenders from previous regimes should be of 
paramount concern to these new governments and their citizens. 
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decide how to enforce the rights at the domestic level. In the inter-
national sphere, the travaux preparatoires for the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights appear to have given considerable 
freedom to states in enforcing their treaty obligations. 185 Yet, the 
text of the Convention can be construed by the designated inter-
national monitoring organization as requiring state parties to safe-
guard some rights through criminal sanctions. 186 More important is 
the behavior of the Human Rights Committee, established to mon-
itor compliance with the Covenant. The Committee has called on 
state parties to investigate, punish, and compensate in cases of 
serious violations of physical integrity-including torture, disap-
pearances, and summary executions. 187 
A regional instrument relevant for South Africa is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,I88 which has language 
requiring state parties to pledge not to violate human rights and to 
ensure that individuals in their countries are able to exercise their 
human rights fully.189 The African Charter provides that state par-
ties "shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms enshrined in 
[the] Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or other mea-
sures to give effect to them."190 Moreover, it insists that every person 
"shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
recognized and guaranteed in the ... Charter ... "191 and "shall 
have the right to an appeal to competent national organs against 
acts violating his fundamental rights."192 As with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a duty to punish persons 
who interfere with the exercise of the human rights of others de-
185 See generally Compilation of the Comments of Governments on the Draft International 
Covenant on Human Rights and on the Proposed Additional Articles, V.N. ESCOR, Com-
mission on Human Rights, 6th Sess., V.N. Doc. ElCN.4/365 (1950). 
186 "The obligation to 'ensure' rights creates affirmative obligations on the state-for 
example, to discipline its officials and to improve administration of criminal justice." Thomas 
Buergenthal, To Respect and To Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE CONVENTION ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 72, 77 
(Louis Henkin ed., 1981). 
187 See Report of the Human Rights Committee, V.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, 
at 124 & 125, V.N. Doc. Al38/40 (1983). 
188 African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981,21 I.L.M. 59 [here-
inafter African Charter]. 
189 Similar language is found in the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,213 V.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European 
Convention], and the American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969,1144 V.N.T.S. 
123 [hereinafter American Convention]. 
190 African Charter, supra note 188, art. 1. 
1911d. art. 2. 
1921d. art. 7(1)(a). 
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rives from the requirement that state parties "ensure" such rights 
by effectively implementing protection provided by domestic law. 193 
Given the preceding interpretation of international instru-
ments, it is the obligation of governments to prosecute human rights 
violators. Therefore, new governments, like the one to be created 
in South Africa, that do not prosecute human rights violators from 
previous regimes risk being ostracized both politically and econom-
ically by other members of the international community who find 
it expedient to demand that human rights offenders be brought to 
justice. 194 
v. CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN AMNESTY LEGISLATION/PROSECUTION 
GUIDELINES 
President De Klerk's hurried passage of the Further Indemnity 
Act over the objections of his own Parliament does not display a 
willingness on his part to subject those suspected of nefarious activ-
ities to standards of international law. 195 The Act has three especially 
glaring shortcomings. First, the aura of secrecy that surrounds the 
entire process creates the impress~on that the government will use 
the process to name only a few token perpetrators while concealing 
the extent of government-sanctioned or officially-orchestrated 
abuses of human rights of the type revealed in fora such as the 
Goldstone Commission hearings. Second, the provision forbidding 
criminal penalties evinces the government's unwillingness to bring 
the guilty to justice. Third, the language barring civil suits indicates 
a lack of empathy for victims and their families who may have been 
193 See supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
194 See, e.g., AHMAD M. KHALIFA, ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ENJOYMENT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND OrHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO THE 
RACIST AND COLONIALIST REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA 3-11 (1987). To achieve this end, new 
governments may even exercise their duty under international jurisdiction. Indeed, such a 
duty on the part of the state derives from international instruments' explicit language to the 
effect that the upholding of democratic values within the state is essential to international 
cooperation and harmony. In terms of European law, the Preamble to the European Con-
vention refers to the existence of political democracy and a common observance of human 
rights as the most effective means of safeguarding "those Fundamental Freedoms which are 
the foundation of justice and peace." European Convention, supra note 189, at Preamble. 
As the Cold War was coming to an end in 1990, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 
heralded a future of intra-European relations "founded on respect and cooperation" and 
affirmed a desire to "consolidate and strengthen democracy as the only system of government 
of our nations." Summit in Europe: Excerpts from the Charter of Paris for a New Europe as Signed 
Yesterday, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1990, at A16. See generally Dinah Shelton, Representative 
Democracy and Human Rights in the Western Hemisphere, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 353 (1991). 
195 See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text. 
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irreparably harmed-physically, psychologically, financially, or oth-
erwise-by their experiences. Thus, it seems that the passage of the 
legislation, rather than representing a symbol of the government's 
desire for reconciliation, may have heightened suspicions in the 
black community that the government takes the behavior of its 
agents lightly and has little interest in the creation of a legal system 
marked by equality for all under the law. 
In contrast to the government's position, the ANC's stance on 
the issue of prosecutions seems to indicate acceptance of interna-
tional legal standards. In late 1992, the organization maintained 
that 
[i]t is not a question of victors punishing the vanquished, or of 
anyone losing or saving face, but of joint responsibility under-
taken by all South Africans to affirm norms and standards of 
accountability that become part and parcel of the new demo-
cratic society and bind all future governments. People in posi-
tions of power, now and in the future, must know that they will 
be held accountable for abuses of the law and violations of 
human rights not only by history but by the agencies of law. 196 
Although the desiderata expressed are laudable, if the organization 
wishes to take the moral high road it must eschew the statement's 
nebulous language in favor of detailed guidelines on the proposed 
treatment of human rights offenders both within its own ranks and 
in the white government. Although arriving at such guidelines re-
quires considerable time, the organization should issue interim 
guidelines to which it will adhere in framing future procedures. 197 
Those guidelines should have the following seven major elements: 
First, the ANC must stress its intention to ratify major inter-
national human rights instruments. The ANC can then appeal to 
these instruments in justifying the need for prosecutions. 
Second, punishable offenses must be specified. They should 
include the commission of torture,19B deaths in detention,199 and 
196 Amnesty for the South African Government, in LAW. COMMITTEE FOR CIV. RTS. UNDER L. 
7 (1992) [hereinafter Amnesty for the South African Government]. 
197 Such guidelines should be used by the ANC in accordance with its pledge to bring 
human rights offenders within the organization to justice. Later, after transition to a demo-
cratic order, the guidelines can be used by the ANC if it dominates the new government or 
as a basis for negotiating on the issue of prosecution if it rules in coalition with the NP or 
other groups. 
19" South African pathologist Dr. Jonathan Gluckman reported in July 1992 that 90% of 
a sample group of 200 persons on whom he had performed autopsies had been tortured to 
death. Bill Keller, South Africa Police Said to Kill Captives, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1992, at A5. 
199 In 1992, 119 people died in police custody. Amnesty for the South African Government, 
supra note 196, at 2. 
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extra-legal killings.20o These were among the most brutal actions 
perpetrated by the authorities under the apartheid regime and the 
actions for which there is the best evidence of direct culpability.201 
Third, as with cases of prosecuting human rights violators else-
where in the world, the question of who should be punishable for 
atrocities-those who gave orders, those who followed them, or 
both-must be resolved. A starting point for further debate would 
be to hold responsible those who created the heinous policies or 
practices, those who carried them out, and those who assisted in 
their implementation. 
Fourth, the investigations must be conducted by neutral parties 
whose own conduct with regard to human rights matters is beyond 
reproach. While at present it may be sufficient for the ANC to 
choose well-known individuals from inside the country,202 prose-
cutions in a new governmental order should be carried out by 
mutually agreed-upon members of the international community, 
ideally drawn from the United Nations or the international human 
rights bar. This would have the effect of creating the impression 
that the body is as impartial as possible and would also lend the 
imprimatur of international law to the government's efforts. 
Fifth, the commission of inquiry must have full investigative 
powers, including the authority to subpoena witnesses and docu-
ments. By its own admission, the ANC's commission found that its 
work was hindered because it lacked this power.203 Typically, NP 
government-appointed commissions have also lacked this broad 
mandate.204 
Sixth, the proceedings must be accompanied by full disclosure 
of the identity of those responsible for human rights violations, the 
200 A number of these are subjects of the Goldstone Commission hearings. See supra note 
26 and accompanying text. In 1990 a government-appointed commission under Justice Louis 
Harms, known as the Harms Commission, considered the issue of state-sponsored violence 
via hit squads and state operatives of the Civil Cooperation Bureau and other organizations. 
Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 3. It emerged that "hit men" were used to assassinate govern-
ment enemies. Id. The Commission's report recommended that those responsible be brought 
to justice, but De Klerk never acted on it. Id. 
201 Perhaps the most famous example of a case in which the identity of those responsible 
is known is that of anti-apartheid activist Steve Biko who died in police custody in 1978. The 
case is discussed in detail in Lynn Berat, Doctors, Detainees, and Torture: Medical Ethics v. the 
Law in South Africa, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 499 (1989). 
202 The ANC commission of inquiry felt that its own composition created the impression 
of pro-ANC bias, particularly among former detainees of whom only a fraction testified. See 
supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
203 See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
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nature of their offenses, and the identity of their victims. The NP 
Minister of Justice has argued, with regard to the Further Indemn-
ity bill, that secrecy is necessary "to encourage prospective applicants 
to submit their applications with confidence.''205 The ANC commis-
sion heard evidence in camera because many of the accused were 
unable to rebut the serious allegations made against them and be-
cause many former detainees were afraid of those who had mis-
treated them. Amnesty International, however, was present. Al-
though the ANC's reasons for secrecy have some merit, such 
concerns can be obviated by allowing for full legal representation206 
of those who appear before the commission and by providing police 
protection for the accused, the accusers, and witnesses.207 
Seventh, guidelines must permit criminal and civil proceedings 
so as to underscore the seriousness with which the government 
regards the past behavior. As for criminal proceedings, procedure 
must specify the range of possible punishments-from amnesty208 
to public censure, from pardon to imprisonment (including life 
terms)-as well as issue sentencing guidelines. Civil suits must also 
be available to victims who, if they cannot afford the legal costs, 
should b~ provided with an attorney. Only if both types of suits are 
allowed will there be a clear message that those who acted with 
impunity, or who might be tempted to do so, will be treated ac-
cordingly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the world witnesses an ever-growing number of transitions 
to democracy, the issues of whether and how to address the human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the old regime are among the most 
anguishing subjects confronting newly democratized societies. In 
the South African case, as elsewhere, the difficulty of moving from 
205 Amnesty Bill, supra note 92, at 2. 
206 Those who cannot afford lawyers should have them provided. Indeed, the availability 
of legal aid has been a difficult problem in South Africa. On legal aid, see generally Lynn 
Berat, Legal Aid and the Indigent Accused in South Africa: A Proposal for Reform, 18 GA. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 239 (1988). 
207 One disturbing aspect of the ANC Commission's behavior is that it released to Nelson 
Mandela the names of those it held responsible for atrocities but did not include them in the 
report. Horror Camps Report, supra note 109, at 3. If, after the ANC conducts its promised 
further investigations, the names are still not released, the ANC will lose much of its moral 
credibility on the issue of prosecutions. 
208 Amnesty, the forgetting of an offense, must be distinguished from pardon, the fore-
going of imposing a penalty. 
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a situation of widespread abuse of human rights to a just legal and 
political order is complicated by the fact that the moral credibility 
of the new government or elements within it may be suspect. For 
example, if a new government takes the form of a pact between the 
NP and the ANC, there is little hope that the NP will be prepared 
to expose those who have served it. Similarly, any failure of the 
ANC to punish those of its members who abused human rights in 
various ANC refugee camps will taint that organization's ability to 
take the moral high road in ferreting out guilty members of the old 
regime. If the new South African government includes Inkatha, the 
behavior of its members in violent incidents throughout the country 
also will call its moral bona fides into question on the issue of pros-
ecutions. 
Nevertheless, in order to achieve the moral renewal of society 
essential to the survival of a democratic ethic, a new South African 
government can enhance its own legitimacy-both domestic and 
international-by appealing to international human rights stan-
dards that require prosecution of human rights offenders. Before 
any action is taken, however, a coherent and comprehensive set of 
guidelines, building upon those suggested here, must be devised so 
as to maximize the consistency and effectiveness of the govern-
ment's policy on the prosecution of human rights offenders. 

